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Abstract
This Note will analyze the market definitions relevant in determining illegal foreclosure effects
in export trade. Part I will discuss the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (the ETCA). Part II
will analyze potential illegal foreclosure effects in United States export trade practices. Part III
will discuss the product and geographic market definitions relevant to a determination of illegal
foreclosure effects. This Note proposes a two step process for evaluating foreclosure in export
markets. First, determine if there is or will be a negative effect on United States consumers if
competitors’ export opportunities are limited. Second, the market should then be defined from the
exporters’ perspective.




When defining markets for the purposes of determining
foreclosure in export trade, the market should be defined dif-
ferently than when the foreclosure occurs in the domestic mar-
ket. To promote competition in the domestic market, United
States antitrust laws' prohibit horizontal2 and vertical' ar-
1. The three basic antitrust statutes are the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647,
§§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209, 209-20 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982))(hereinafter Sherman Act), the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38
Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982)), and the Clayton
Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982)).
See also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 44-53 (3rd ed. 1981). The original United
States antitrust statute is the Sherman Act, which condemns contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade, and monopolizations, combinations to monop-
olize or attempts to monopolize.
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as a rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competi-
tive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the low-
est prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material progress, while at
the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). The Sherman Act is
intended to reach combinations or conspiracies which restrain freedom of action in
interstate commerce. Id. at 4-5.
The Federal Trade Commission Act specifically concentrates on unfair methods
of competition. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982). "Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce, are declared unlawful." Id.
The Clayton Act was passed to supplement the Sherman and Federal Trade
Commission Acts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. Section 2 of the Clayton Act forbids price
discrimination practices including selling a product at different prices to similarly
situated buyers. See 15 U.S.C. § 13. Section 3 forbids tying and exclusive dealing
contracts. See 15 U.S.C. § 14. Section 7 of the act bans corporations from acquiring
competing companies through mergers. See 15 U.S.C. § 18. The prohibitions were
qualified to the extent that the specified practice was illegal only when "the effect...
may be substantially to lessen competition" or "tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14.
In determining antitrust violations, two basic approaches are used: the first is
the "rule of reason;" the second is the "per se" doctrine. When applying the rule of
reason standard, before judging the legality of an arrangement, a broad inquiry
should be made into the nature, purpose, and effect of any challenged arrangement.
See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911); Standard
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rangements which foreclose foreign markets to United States
competitors.4 A person5 with market power" in an export
trade market can adversely affect domestic competition 7 by
limiting the export trade opportunities of export competitors
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). The per se doctrine labels certain
practices illegal regardless of the reasons for the practice. Courts, when they apply
the per se rule, only have to determine whether the alleged conduct was engaged in
and, if so, whether it fell within the definition of conduct proscribed as per se unlaw-
ful. E.g., Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-88 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 936 (1979). Once it is determined that the conduct alleged did take place
then under the per se analysis these restraints are presumed unreasonable "without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use." Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See gener-
ally , P. AREEDA, supra, 317; SECTION OF ANTITRUST, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 15-24 (2d ed. 1984). [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DE-
VELOPMENTS].
2. See infra notes 57-96 and accompanying text. A horizontal arrangement is an
agreement or merger between companies "performing similar functions in the pro-
duction or sale of comparable goods or services .... Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1961). In Brown Shoe, the Government filed an action al-
leging that a contemplated merger between the G.R. Kinney Company, Inc. and the
Brown Shoe Company would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 296. The
Court held that the district court properly found that the predominantly medium-
priced shoes which Brown Shoe manufactured did not occupy a different product
market than the predominatly low-priced shoes which Kinney sold. Id. at 326.
Therefore, a merger of Brown and Kinney would have substantially lessened compe-
tition in retail sales in the majority of the markets in which the two corporations were
active. Id. at 334-36.
3. See infra notes 97-145 and accompanying text. A firm is vertically intergrated
when it does for itself what otherwise could be done by independent firms in the
marketplace. P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 218.
4. See supra note 1. Antitrust cases are not always easily classified as either verti-
cal or horizontal. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
Some mergers that are neither horizontal nor vertical are called "conglomerate
mergers." See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 207 (1977). The Supreme Court has held
conglomerate mergers unlawful on several grounds. These include: threats to poten-
tial competition; see, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526
(1973); "entrenchment" of a dominant party; see, e.g., F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); and the creation of opportunities for reciprocity; see, e.g.,
F.T.C. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
5. A "person" or "persons" includes corporations and associations existing
under the laws of the United States or a foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 7.
6. Market power is the ability of a firm to act in a less than perfectly competitive
manner. P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 227.
7. This adverse effect on domestic competition is known as a "spillover effect."
See Note, Limiting Spillover and Foreclosure Through Title III oJ the Export Trading Company
Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1300 (1984). If export conduct has an anticompeti-
tive effect only on foreign markets it should not be subject to United States antitrust
laws unless United States consumers are harmed. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (1979).
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who also compete in the United States market.8 Foreclosure 9
is the effect of conduct that reduces or eliminates the opportu-
nities of export competitors. Foreclosure of export markets
exists when United States export competitors are willing and
able to sell into a foreign market but discover they cannot be-
cause another exporter has precluded their opportunities to
export into this market.' ° Under United States antitrust laws,
foreclosing competitors from any substantial United States
market is a per se violation of United States antitrust laws.''
However, the same activity in an export market may not be a
per se violation. 1
Market definitions are used in determining whether com-
petitors are being foreclosed from the market.' 3 The market
can be defined from either the buyer's or the seller's perspec-
tive. 4 United States antitrust laws are primarily concerned
with the negative effects of anticompetitive practices on United
States consumers.5 If a firm has the power to exclude compe-
tition in the export market, and that exclusion has anticompeti-
8. See Margulies, U.S. Export Conduct (Including Cartels) Under U.S. Antitrust Law, in
1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 294 (B. Hawk ed. 1985).
9. See generally Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
10. See Margulies, supra note 8, at 294.
11. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). In this
case, the country's largest producer of salt for industrial purposes owned patents on
the machines for the utilization of these salt products. Id. at 394. These machines
were distributed under leases which required the lessees to purchase the salt needed
to utilize these machines exclusively from International Salt. Id.
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
13. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, § 211.
14. When defining markets from the seller's perspective look at the area to
which the seller can reasonably turn to "sell." When defining from the buyer's per-
spective look to the market in which buyers reasonably turn to "buy." For a discus-
sion of defining markets from the buyer's perspective, see Karp, A Consumer Oriented
Approach to Market Definition under the Antitrust Laws, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 221 (1984). For a
discussion of the protection of seller's interests see Harris &Jorde, Antitrust Market
Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 16-17 (1984).
15. "A primary objective of antitrust laws is to preserve competition, and thus
ultimately protect the interests of American consumers." Laker Airways, Ltd., v.
Sabcna, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Pfizer Inc.
v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978)). Areeda and Turner state that the objective of
United States antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare by promoting efficient
use and allocation of scarce resources. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
§ 103 (1978). Another commentator has said:
In cases involving domestic or import commerce, the Department ofJustice
and the Supreme Court have in recent years adhered to the view that the
antitrust laws are designed to preserve competition in domestic markets in
1986]
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tive effects on United States consumers, that can indicate that
an illegal foreclosure effect has occurred in the export mar-
ket.' 6 In making a determination of whether an actual or po-
tential foreclosure of export trade has occurred it is essential
to define the relevant product and geographic markets.' 7
This Note will analyze the market definitions relevant in
determining illegal foreclosure effects in export trade. Part I
will discuss the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (the
ETCA).18 Part II will analyze potential illegal foreclosure ef-
fects' 9 in United States export trade practices.2 ° Part III will
order to prevent a deterioration of consumer welfare, and not designed to
protect individual competitors.
Margulies, supra note 8, at 284.
Furthermore, case law has also supported the proposition that the antitrust laws
were designed to protect consumers:
[T]he Anti-Trust Act was intended in the most comprehensive way to pro-
vide against combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce,
the monopolization of trade or commerce or attempts to monopolize the
same. [citations omitted]. In other words, founded upon broad concep-
tions of public policy, the prohibitions of the statute were enacted to pre-
vent not the mere injury to an individual which would arise from the doing
of the prohibited acts, but the harm to the general public which would be
occasioned by the evils which it was contemplated would be prevented, and
hence not only the prohibitions of the statute but the remedies which it pro-
vided were co-extensive with such conceptions.
Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prod. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1915).
"The statutes were intended to advance the public welfare by promoting free
competition and preventing undue restriction of trade and commerce." Northwest-
ern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 792 (1944).
16. See Margulies, supra note 8, at 285; Note, supra note 7, at 1322-23.
17. See Harris &Jorde, supra note 14, at 4; see also infra notes 196-202 and accom-
panying text.
18. Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 372,
635a-4, 1841, 1843 (1982); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45a, 4001-4021 (1982)), reprinted in THE
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT 183 [hereinafter ETCA STATUTE]. Prior to the enact-
ment of the ETCA the broad language of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act caused
uncertainty as to the applicability of the act to export trade practices. Margulies,
supra note 8, at 287-89.
The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982), provided antitrust
immunity to associations engaged in export trade, and for acts and agreements in the
course of export trade, provided the associations did not restrain trade within the
United States and did not restrain the export trade of United States competitors.
The Webb-Pomerene Act's coverage was limited and did not entirely remove the
threat of Sherman Act violations to exporters. See, Note supra note 7, at 1310-11
n.68.
19. Not all foreclosure effects in export trade are forbidden. Section 6a of the
ETCA forbids only those foreclosure effects that have a negative impact on United
States exporters. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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discuss the product and geographic market definitions relevant
to a determination of illegal foreclosure effects. 2 1 This Note
proposes a two step process for evaluating foreclosure in ex-
port markets. First, determine if there is or will be a negative
effect on United States consumers if competitors' export op-
portunities are limited. Second, the market should then be de-
fined from the exporters' perspective.22 When litigating the is-
sue it should be the defendant's responsibility to introduce evi-
dence of potential alternative markets,23 and the plaintiff
should have the opportunity to rebut the feasibility of these
potential markets .24
I. THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT
Historically, the uncertain jurisdictional reach of United
States antitrust laws was one of the underlying reasons for the
problems experienced by United States exporters in interna-
tional markets. 25 As a result, United States firms were deterred
20. See infra notes 57-145 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 146-202 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
24. See id.
25. Among the other changed circumstances that compelled the United States
to reassess its international anititrust policy are:
(1) The increased importance of international trade to the United States,
(2) The relative decline of United States industrial preeminence in the world,
(3) The significant increase in enforcement of foreign competition laws,
(4) The increasingly hostile foreign reaction to recent United States antitrust efforts,
(5) The growing demand by developing countries for international regulation of re-
strictive business practices, monopolies and multinational firms,
(6) The increased commercial role of foreign governments and state-controlled in-
strumentalities in international trade.
See Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for
Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 206-13 (1982).
"Although the ratio of exports to GNP rose from 4.2 percent in 1972 to 7.5
percent in 1979, U.S. imports, led by massive increases in the cost of oil, grew equally
as fast, increasing in importance relative to GNP from 5.1 percent to 8.7 percent in
these same years." S. REP. No. 27, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981), reprinted in, THE
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT 363, 366 (1983) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. In
1981, imports had expanded since 1972 from a higher base than exports, and the
trade deficit had expanded sharply, with an aggregate deficit over the previous five
years exceeding $140 billion. Id.
Because of their superior international competitiveness in manufac-
tured goods, United States major trade competitors have been able to offset
their imported energy bills much better than the United States. According
to a study done by the National Association of Manufacturers last year, im-
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from forming their own export trading companies and engag-
ing in other productive and efficient methods of exporting, in-
vesting, and doing business abroad. In 1981, only ten percent
of United States manufacturing firms exported,26 and fewer
than one percent of these firms accounted for eighty percent of
United States exports.27 The future expansion of exports was
dependent upon the development of export trading compa-
nies, 2 8 because the high costs and antitrust violation risks of
engaging in export ventures discouraged producers from par-
ticipating in export trade activities.29
The goal of Congress in enacting the ETCA was to in-
crease the exports of American goods and services by remov-
ing restrictions on certain export trade practices and financ-
ing." The ETCA was an important aspect of the Govern-
ports of manufactured goods increased nearly four times as fast as exports
since 1970, with that margin growing in the last half of the decade. The
study further concluded that our industrial competitiveness is declining
measured both by increased import penetration here and loss of export
markets elsewhere. The U.S. share of world markets declined from 21.3
percent to 17.4 percent over the past ten years, the largest relative decline
among major industrial exporters. The United States has lost market share
in 8 of the 9 EC countries and 12 of the 13 OPEC countries. While the
United States manufactured goods trade has stayed in rough balance, Japan
and West Germany in 1979 had surpluses of $70 billion and $60 billion
respectively.
Id.
26. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 5.
27. Id.
28. For the purposes of this Note, an export trading company is defined as:
[A] person, partnership, association, or similiar organization, whether oper-
ated for profit or as a nonprofit organization, which does business under the
laws of the United States or any State and which is organized and operated
principally for purposes of-
(A) exporting goods or services produced in the United States; or
(B) facilitating the exportation of goods or services produced in the
United States by unaffiliated persons by providing one or more export trade
services;
15 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(4) (1982).
29. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 5, 18-19.
30. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 372, 1841-1843 (1982), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 15. 26, 4011-4021
(1982)). At the time the ETCA was passed, United States exports were responsible
for one out of every nine manufacturingjobs in the United States, and generated one
out of every seven dollars of total United States goods produced. 15 U.S.C. § 4001.
United States trade deficits at that time contributed to the decline of the dollar in the
international currency markets and had an inflationary impact upon the United States
economy. Id. Furthermore, the United States lagged disproportionately behind
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ment's strategy to reposition United States industry in
international markets.31 It reformed United States antitrust
laws by removing the regulatory obstacles to mergers for ex-
porting purposes, thereby creating greater efficiencies in ex-
porting.32
The ETCA is divided into four titles.33 Title I of the
ETCA establishes an office in the Department of Commerce to
promote the formation of export trade associations and export
trading companies.34 An export trading company (ETC) is an
entity that links United States producers of goods and services
with foreign markets.35 Title II allows bank holding companies
to own ETC's and thereby engage in international trade.36
Title III establishes a voluntary mechanism that an ex-
porter can use to obtain a Certificate of Review from the Secre-
tary of Commerce. 7 The Title III certification process enables
other developed countries in the export of goods, services, and agricultural products.
Id.
31. Lacy, The ETC Act, 1985, EXPORT TODAY, Fall 1985, at 69, 73. The ETCA
removes the regulatory obstacles in export trade by amending the Sherman and the
Federal Trade Commission acts to clarify their application to international trade. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a) (1982). Furthermore, the Title III certification process
removes the threat of antitrust violations as well. See 15 U.S.C. § 4016 (1982).
32. See supra note 31.
33. For the purposes of this Note, Titles III and IV are the most relevant to the
topic of foreclosure in export trade. For a discussion of the treatment of United
States export conduct prior to the enactment of the ETCA see Margulies, supra note
8, at 287-89.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 4003 (1982); see also ETCA STATUTE, supra note 18, at 185.
35. See Raiken, ETCs Defined, in THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT 29 (1983).
36. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1842, 1843(c)(14) (1982).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 4011 (1982). For a discussion on the procedure for issuance of
Export Trade Certificates of Review, see the Department of Commerce Guidelines
for Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review, 50 Fed. Reg. 1786 (Jan. 11,
1985). [hereinafter CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES]. See also Fox, Antitrust and Export Trade,
in THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT 57, 78-85 (1983); Horizons Int'l Inc. v. Bal-
dridge, 624 F.Supp. 1560 (E.D.Pa. 1986) (review of the procedure for the issuance of
a certificate to a joint venture).
After the passage of the ETCA, the Department of Commerce formed the Office
of Export Trading Company Affairs (OETCA) to promote the formation of ETC's
and to administer the Title III Antitrust Certificate of Review program. Lacy, supra
note 31, at 69. By the fall of 1985, fifty-seven certificates were issued, giving protec-
tion to 218 individuals and firms in manufacture, agriculture, and the service indus-
tries. Id. at 71.
15 U.S.C. § 4013 (1982) gives the procedure for the issuance ofan Export Trade
Certificate of Review:
(b) Within ninety days after the Secretary receives an application for a cer-
tificate of review, the Secretary shall determine whether the applicant's ex-
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an exporter to receive an advance determination concerning
specified export conduct.38 In order to obtain a Certificate of
Review, the conduct must meet certain statutory standards.39
port trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation meet the stan-
dards of subsection (a) of this section. If the Secretary, with the concur-
rence of the Attorney General, determines that standards are met, the
Secretary shall issue to the applicant a certificate of review. The certificate
of review shall specify-
(1) the export trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation
to which the certificate applies,
(2) the person to whom the certificate of review is issued, and
(3) any terms and conditions the Secretary or the Attorney General
deems necessary to assure compliance with the standards of subsection (a)
of this section.
(c) If the applicant indicates a special need for prompt disposition, the Sec-
retary and the Attorney General may expedite action on the application, ex-
cept that no certificate of review may be issued within thirty days of publica-
tion of notice in the Federal Register under section 4012(b)(l) of this title.
(d)(1) If the Secretary denies in whole or in part an application for a certifi-
cate, he shall notify the applicant of his determination and the reasons for it.
(2) An applicant may, within thirty days of receipt of notification that the
application has been denied in whole or in part, request the Secretary to
reconsider the determination. The Secretary, with the concurrence of the
Attorney General, shall notify the applicant of the determination upon re-
consideration within thirty days of receipt of the request.
(e) If the Secretary denies an application for the issuance of a certificate
of review and thereafter receives from the applicant a request for the return
of documents submitted by the applicant in connection with the application
for the certificate, the Secretary and the Attorney General shall return to the
applicant, not later than thirty days after receipt of the request, the docu-
ments and all copies of the documents available to the Secretary and the
Attorney General, except to the extent that the information contained in a
document has been made available to the public.
(0) A certificate shall be void ab initio with respect to any export trade, ex-
port trade activities, or methods of operation for which a certificate was pro-
cured by fraud.
Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4013.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 4012; CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra note 37. The statutory
standards are:
(a) A certificate of review shall be issued to any applicant that establishes
that its specified export trade, export trade activities, and methods of opera-
tion will-
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint
of trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint of the export
trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the
United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class ex-
ported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors
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After the certificate's issuance, it confers significant protection
for the specified conduct from federal and state antitrust suits,
and it reduces an exporter's private action liability from treble
to single damages.4" Title IV of the ETCA modifies the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, 41 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 4 2 to require, as a jurisdictional threshhold for en-
forcement actions in export trade activities, a "direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably forseeable" effect on commerce in the
United States or on the export commerce of a United States
resident.4 3
Titles III and IV both discuss foreclosure. Title III denies
certification if the proposed conduct will either have a substan-
tial anticompetitive effect on United States export competi-
tors, 44 or will constitute an unfair method of competition
against United States export competitors. 45 Title IV amends
the Sherman Act by inserting after section 6: "Sections 1 to 7
of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or com-
merce ... with foreign nations unless .. .such conduct has a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect... on ex-
port trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a per-
son engaged in such trade or commerce in the United
States."'46 The Federal Trade Commission Act 4 7 was amended
to allow unfair methods of competition in foreign commerce,
engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class
exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in the
sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the goods, wares,
merchandise, or services exported by the applicant.
15 U.S.C. § 4013.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 4016; see also Margulies, supra note 8, at 289-90.
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982); see also supra note 1.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982); see also supra note 1.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1) (1982) (substantial anti-competitive effect). How-
ever, the mere fact that an applicant's conduct would displace sales of other United
States exporters is not enough to deny certification. CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra
note 37.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(3) (1982) (unfair methods of competition).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l)(B).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982); see also supra note 1. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act deals specifically with unfair methods of competition. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (1982). "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlaw-
ful." Id.
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unless there is a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect" on the export trade of United States persons or
has an impact on domestic commerce.48
The goal of the ETCA was to increase United States ex-
ports by encouraging more efficient means of exporting,49 and
this goal should be considered in determining what constitutes
a substantial anticompetitive effect 50 or an unreasonable re-
straint of trade. Restraints in export trade that serve legitimate
objectives under the ETCA but which restrain other domestic
export competitors should not be automatically declared ille-
gal because the benefits of the increase in exports may out-
weigh any anticompetitive effects."'
Some foreign governments have criticized the ETCA be-
cause it allegedly encourages United States exporters to en-
gage in anticompetitive conduct in foreign markets. 52 How-
48. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 4001(b).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 4013.
51. The 1983 Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Re-
view, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,937 (1983), specifically authorizes exclusive arrangements that
foreclose trade opportunities in foreign markets of competing United States export-
ers. Id. at 15,938. Arrangements of this type are necessary to achieve the goals of the
ETCA. Exclusivity agreements can violate Title III, 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1), (3), be-
cause they can have an adverse affect on United States export competitors. There-
fore, such arrangements would not be specifically authorized unless they were con-
sidered an important element of successful export ventures.
52. Margulies, supra note 8, at 286. United States antitrust laws are also fre-
quently criticized for their extraterritorial jurisdictional reach. Note, The Use ofInterest
Analysis in the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law, 16 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 147, 163-65 (1983); see also United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).
The Alcoa court states that the Sherman Act can be applied to foreign conspira-
cies, even though the alleged activities occurred entirely outside the United States
and involving no United States parties. The case established an "effects test":
United States antitrust laws applied if the foreign conspiracy was intended to affect
United States commerce. 148 F.2d at 443-44.
Foreign commentators criticize the Alcoa effects doctrine because it conflicts with
the general principles of sovereignty. See generally Miller, Ext raterritorial Effects of Trade
Regulation, IIl U. PA. L. REv. 1092, 1130 (1963).
IT]he Alcoa pattern of case goes too far when 'jurisdiction' is assumed over
foreigners' foreign agreements, merely because it has been possible to al-
lege some 'effects' on United States imports or exports, and because the
agreement would have been illegal if made in the United States.
Id. at 1130 (quoting Jennings, ExtrateoitoriaIJurisdiction and the U7nited States Antitrst
Laws, 119571 BRIr. Y.B. INT'l. 1L. 146, 175 (1958)).
Many foreign governments have "blocking" or "claw back" laws that deter or
block United States antitrust investigations. See Hawk, sura note 25, at 208-09.
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ever, the United States's approach to export cartels and other
export trade practices resembles the antitrust efforts of other
countries. To violate the articles in the Treaty establishing
the European Economic Communities 54 (Treaty of Rome),
which regulate anticompetitive conduct, the conduct must have
the prohibited competitive effects within the Common Market
and an effect on trade between member states.55 The antitrust
laws of both France and the Federal Republic of Germany ex-
empt export conduct if it has no effect on the domestic mar-
ket. 5
6
II. FORECLOSURE RISKS IN EXPORT TRADE PRACTICES
This section will discuss the potential risks of illegal fore-
closure effects in export trade practices. Both horizontal5 7 and
vertical58 export trade practices will be discussed. The pur-
pose of this section is to clarify the definition of foreclosure
and to introduce some of the common export trade practices
used today.
A. Horizontal Export Restraints
Horizontal export activity usually involves several manu-
facturing firms combining to form an export cartel,59 or a joint
venture among service firms. 60 A horizontal merger occurs
when a producer acquires another firm that produces or sells,
in the same geographical market, either an identical product or
a close substitute for it. 6I Horizontal market division occurs
53. Margulies, supra note 8, at 285.
54. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 5.
55. Margulies, supra note 8, at 285; see also Treaty of Rome, supra note 54, at art.
85 & 86 at 47-49.
56. OECD, COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIONS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES 47-48 (1978). For a discussion on the West German approach to export
cartels, see Hilzler & Braun, Antitrust Control over "pure export cartels: the new German
approach, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 957 (1982).
57. See infra notes 59-96 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 97-145 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text. An export cartel is an associa-
tion engaged solely in export trade. See, e.g., United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc.
v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 198 (1945) (an export cartel involved in the export of
alkalies); 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
§ 9.35 (2d ed. 1981).
60. See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
61. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 900.
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when competitors assign exclusive territories among them-
selves.62 In the domestic market, arrangements that divide
markets between competitors are per se illegal under the anti-
trust laws.63 In arrangements which allocate sections of the
world as exclusive territories, any world market division involv-
ing the assignment of the United States as an exclusive terri-
tory has been held illegal in the past.64
Price fixing 65 among United States competitors for export
purposes is legal if the venture is a certified Title III approved
venture,6 6 or if the price fixing arrangement does not either
produce a direct anticompetitive effect on United States com-
merce67 or foreclose the export opportunities of other domes-
62. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, :341 U.S. 593 (1951). The
Court, in this case, condemned an allocation of territories throughout worldwide
markets between the dominant United States producer of tapered roller bearings and
British and French firms. Id. at 595-97; see also United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972). Topco was the first case in which market allocations were de-
clared per se illegal, whether or not ancillary to price-fixing or other market-rigging
arrangements. Id. at 608.
63. See United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Topco was a coop-
erative association of approximately 25 regional supermarket chains that operated in
33 states in the United States. Id. at 598. Topco's basic function was to act as a
purchasing agent for its members. Id. The cooperative's bylaws created three cate-
gories of territorial licenses that such member could secure from the association. Id.
at 601. The Court held that these restraints of trade were horizontal in nature and
therefore per se violations of the Sherman Act. Id. at 608.
64. See, e.g., Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc., 86 F.Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). In Alkali
Export, a Webb-Pomerene association's international agreements with foreign compa-
nies that allocated exclusive markets for alkalis, assigned quotas in sundry markets,
fixed prices on an international scale, and sold through joint agents were not "agree-
ments in the course of export trade" within the meaning of the Webb-Pomerene Act.
Therefore, the agreements violated the Sherman Act. Alkali, 86 F. Supp. at 70.
"Consequently, to hold in this case that defendants, by employing the medium of an
export association, may restrain our foreign trade with impunity, uninhibited by the
sanctions and proscriptions of the Sherman Act, would be to ignore the plain intent
of the statute." Id. at 66-67. Although the association in this case was organized
under the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982), the wording of the act is
substantially similiar to the ETCA. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 62 with 15 U.S.C. § 4013. See
also Margulies, supra note 8, at 305-11.
65. Price fixing involves agreements among competitors that raise, lower or sta-
bilize prices. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 29. See Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (" 'price fixing' is a
shorthand way of describing certain categories of business behavior.")
66. H.R. REP. No. 924, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2501 (1982) (Conference Report).
67. See, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804
(D.C.Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
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tic firms. 68 A parent company may set prices or allocate exclu-
sive territories for subsidiaries which it fully controls.6 9
Joint exporting activity poses the greatest risk of antitrust
violations to United States exporters.7 ° Nevertheless, United
States firms have been compelled to form either export cartels
or joint ventures. Forming an export cartel or joint venture is
often necessary to bargain collectively with either foreign buy-
ers or governments, to secure more favorable trade or tax con-
cessions, or to compete with other foreign trading compa-
nies. 71 Therefore, joint exporting is the type of activity most
likely to seek Title III certification. Export cartels and joint
ventures are the two most commonly used horizontal export
trade activities. Export cartels and joint ventures will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in the next two sections of this Note.
1. Export Cartels
An export cartel is an arrangement in which competing
United States export firms have substituted an agreement on
price, output, or market division for independent decision
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a) (1982).
69. United States Department ofJustice Antitrust Guide for International Oper-
ations, Case A at 12 (Revised March 1, 1977) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDE]. The
Department of Justice generally looks to see if the parent controls a majority of the
voting stock of the subsidiary when determining if the parent fully controls the sub-
sidiary. Id. However, the Department ofJustice has indicated that it may also apply
the same reasoning when the parent is a minority shareholder that maintains effective
working control. Id. at 12-13.
70. See Fox, supra note 37, at 60-61.
An American company engaging in exports could violate the U.S. antitrust
laws by a single firm act of monopolization (which is theoretically possible,
but rare), or by a contract, combination or conspiracy that unduly restrains
domestic competition or the trade of a U.S. exporter or other U.S. trader in
foreign commerce. Most often, if there is a risk of violation, it arises from
joint export activity.
Id.; see also 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 59, § 2.10.
Although no cases had been brought against joint selling by American ex-
porters, the law's shadow had been cast by the shipping cases and Anerican
Tobacco. After a lengthy investigation, the Federal Trade Commission con-
cluded that American exporters were at a disadvantage in foreign markets
because of the possible illegality of export combinations under the Sherman
Act. One disadvantage was the inability to pool costs in order to meet the
competition of foreign selling combines. This was felt to be a special disad-
vantage to small American firms which might not be able to export alone but
could afford it in combination with competitors.
Id. (citations omitted).
71. See 1 J. ATwoOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 59, § 9.02.
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making. 72 If that arrangement operates to restrain exports of
domestic firms that do not participate in the cartel, then the
risk of illegal foreclosure effects increases.73 When domestic
manufacturers combine to export, their collaborative refusal to
sell to independent exporters may be either a restraint of trade
within the United States, or a restraint of the export trade of a
competitor, even if the exporting manufacturers are certified
under Title III.7' Foreclosure problems may also exist when
competing exporters exclude a domestic competitor from ac-
cess to an export cartel that is essential to successful export-
ing.75 This situation could arise when the domestic market for
the relevant product is concentrated and noncompetitive, and
when the exclusion would seriously damage the excluded com-
petitor's ability to compete in the domestic market.76 Thus,
the exclusion could substantially lessen domestic competi-
77tion.
72. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 405a.
The perfect cartel would, like a monopolist, maximize the excess of aggre-
gate revenues over aggregate costs. Thus to maximize industry cost, set
price and output so as to maximize net profits, and divide the profits among
members according to some agreed-upon formula - in proportion, for ex-
ample, to pre-cartel market shares. Absent such centralization creating and
maintaining a successful cartel is hampered by divergent interests strong
temptations to cheat on the cartel price, non-price competition, and changes
in market share.
Id. at § 405b.
For years the United States pursued an anticartel policy. See United States v.
General Elec. Co., 80 F.Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. National Lead
Co., 63 F.Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v.
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F.Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). However, in the 1950's it
was recognized that the per se rules of illegality were inappropriate for foreign com-
merce. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 59, § 2.17.
73. One of the primary concerns of antitrust enforcement is to protect United
States export opportunites against privately imposed restriction. See ANTITRUST
GUIDE, supra note 69, at 5. United States firms engaged in the export of goods, serv-
ices, or capital should not be foreclosed from competition because a bigger, less prin-
cipled competitor has imposed a restriction on trade. Id.
74. 1 1. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 59, § 9.42; United States v. Alkali
Export Ass'n, Inc., 86 F.Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). In this Alkali, the court held that
agreements among cartel members barring sales to independent exporters were ille-
gal. Alkali, 86 F. Supp. at 74-77.
75. Margulies, supra note 8, at 299; see also 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, sopra
note 59, § 7.24. An essential exporting facility is an export market in which, if ex-
cluded, an exporter cannot make up the loss by exporting to other markets.
76. Margulies, smpra note 8, at 299.
77. Id.
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If the cartel were to engage in the export of a product in
which there were no substantial entry barriers into production
of that product, and consumers could readily substitute prod-
ucts if the price of the first product were to increase, the De-
partment of Commerce has indicated that it would certify
agreements among cartel members. 78  The cartel could estab-
lish, by agreement among its members, the prices at which the
goods would be purchased and sold for export 79 and could
agree to allocate among cartel members the quantities of
goods sold for export by the cartel. If the cartel were to en-
gage in activities that involved a homogenous product in which
there were high entry barriers to production and the market
was highly concentrated, then the Department would put re-
strictions in the certificate.80
2. Joint Ventures
Joint ventures can serve beneficial and procompetitive
functions with the increase in efficiency usually offsetting any
anticompetitive foreclosure effects. The procompetitive effects
of the joint venture should therefore be balanced against any
anticompetitve effects. 8 1 Joint ventures are business organiza-
78. CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 1796.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1796-97. For example, the Department would put restrictions on what
type of information could be exchanged between the producers. Id. at 1797. The
Department would require that all meetings and telephone conversations be moni-
tored by knowledgeable counsel and that accurate and complete records of all such
discussion should be kept. Id. Finally, the certificate would be limited in duration to
a period reasonably necessary to develop a business plan. Id.
81. J.T. Halverson, Transnational Joint Ventures and Mergers Under U.S. Antitrust
Law, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 143, 175-76 (B. Hawk ed. 1985). One com-
mentator has identified three primary anticompetitive risks of joint ventures.
Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1530-34 (1982).
These are collusion, reductions in potential competition, and the exclusion of com-
petitors from a joint venture which creates significant market power for the joint
venture. Id. Direct collusion occurs when joint venture operations enable the joint
venture partners to jointly regulate their individual outputs. Id. at 1530. A joint
venture that practices collusion could therefore take on some of the characteristics of
a cartel. A reduction in potential competiton may occur because of the interdepen-
dence of interest resulting from co-ownership of the joint venture. Id. at 1531. Fi-
nally, ajoint venture may have anticompetitive effects because it excludes or hampers
outside firms' access to an essential market. This can occur when competitors with
market power form a marketing or input supply joint venture and the joint venture
has natural monopoly characteristics. Id. at 1532.
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tions" which have a variety of different forms. The Justice De-
partment has divided joint ventures into two categories. The
"one shot" consortium is an entity engaged in a single venture
that is limited in time and scope.8 " Other joint ventures are
unlimited in time and scope. These unlimited joint ventures
usually combine for the production or distribution of products
and services.84 Joint research ventures involve two competi-
tors which combine to jointly research and develop new
processes or products. 5 Manufacturing joint ventures are
combinations of producers who come together for the purpose
of manufacturing a particular product or products.8 6
One shot and unlimited joint ventures raise different anti-
trust risks with one shot joint venture arrangements tending to
have fewer illegal antitrust problems.8 7 When competitors
with market power form a joint venture, that joint venture may
have illegal foreclosure effects because the members of the
joint venture may either partially or totally restrict non-mem-
ber firms' access to an essential exporting facility. 8 Competi-
tors of the venture may have to be granted access to an essen-
tial market.89 These types of ventures should seek Title III
82. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 69, at 19.
83. See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 69, case C, at 19-22. The recent General
Motors Corporation and Toyota Motor Corporation joint venture is an example of a
one shot consortium. See also In Re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984).
The joint venture was limited to no more than 250,000 subcompact cars per year, for
a period of twelve years.
84. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 69, case C, at 19.
85. See id. case D, at 23-27.
86. See id. case E, at 28-32.
87. See, e.g., id. case C, at 19-21. But see id. case B, at 15-18. "It seems unlikely
that Section 7 [of the Clayton Act] would apply here because there is no suggestion
that Glint [a fictitious German manufacturer] is engaged in making sales in the
United States." Id. at 15. For a discussion of this fictitious case see infra note 107.
88. Halverson, supra note 81, at 175.
[A] joint venture may injure competition by excluding or hampering
outside firms in their access to an essential requirement. This result will
most likely occur when competitors with market power form a marketing or
input supply joint venture and the joint venture has natural monopoly char-
acteristics. In the extreme, refusal by the joint venture to deal with outside
firms may totally exclude such firms from the market.
Id.; see, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1944) (refusal by a co-
operative news gathering agency to deal with non-member newspapers totally ex-
cluded these non-member newspapers from the market).
89. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347-49 (1963); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1944). In Silver, two Texas broker-dealers
in securities who were not members of the New York Stock Exchange, arranged for
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certification, because they will be treated by the courts or the
Justice Department as if they had merged.9" In comparison,
when the joint venture is a one shot consortium engaged in a
single venture limited in time and scope, it usually presents no
foreclosure problems. 91 Although the risk of an illegal foreclo-
sure effect in a one shot consortium situation is less than if the
joint venture were unlimited, the one shot consortium may still
want to apply for Title III certification.92
A per se violation of the antitrust laws occurs when a joint
venture engages in anticompetitive conduct. 93  Per se viola-
tions must either have a "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on trade within the United States,94 or it
must interfere with the export trade of a United States ex-
porter.95 If the price fixing or horizontal market division
agreement only has negative impacts outside the United
States, the conduct is legitimate.96
B. Vertical Export Restraints
Vertical restraints do not ordinarily have any substantial
anticompetitive effects 97 but they may restrain competition by
direct wire telephone connections to member firms of the Exchange. 373 U.S. at
343. The information communicated through these connections were essential to
the conduct of the two Texas brokers' business. Id. Temporary approval was origi-
nally granted by the Exchange, but Without prior notice to the Texas brokers, the
Exchange denied the brokers access to these communications. Id. at 344. Allegedly,
as a result, one broker was forced out of business and the other broker suffered busi-
ness losses. Id. at 344-45. The Court held that the removal of the direct-wire con-
nections constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act, because it was a group
boycott which deprived the two Texas brokers of a valuable business service which
they needed to compete effectively as broker-dealers in the over-the-counter securi-
ties market. Id. at 347-49. In Associated Press, a cooperative, engaged in gathering and
distributing news to cooperative members, prohibited access to cooperative gathered
news to non-members of the cooperative. 326 U.S. at 3-4. The Supreme Court ap-
proved the district court decree that was interpreted as meaning that Associated
Press news is to be furnished to competitors of members without discrimination
through by-laws controlling membership, or through other methods. Id. at 12.
90. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 69, at 21.
91. Id., case C, at 19-22.
92. CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 1797-98.
93. For example, a price-fixing horizontal market division arrangement. See AN-
TITRUST GUIDE, supra note 69, cases C, D, & M, at 19-27, 58-61.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 1792.
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foreclosing an export market to the domestic competitors of
the exporting firm." Vertical integration is an arrangement
among firms at different levels of the market structure, such as
an arrangement between a manufacturer and its distributors."O
Vertical restraints in export competition include arrangements
such as exclusive selling and exclusive dealing agreements,' 00
licensing agreements,101 and tie-ins.' 2 These restraints may
threaten the survival of existing export competitors and dis-
courage new entrants into the market. 0 3 Eventually, these re-
straints can lead to a higher concentration of firms in the do-
mestic market.104 If domestic competitors are foreclosed from
either expanding exports or are barred from exporting, their
ability to compete effectively in the domestic market may be
threatened.
Domestic consumers are not always harmed when compet-
itors are foreclosed from an export market.' 0 5 If the effects of
being foreclosed from an export market were to lead to the
demise of firms, then so long as other potential markets exist
and access to production is not prohibitively expensive, new
firms would enter the market to replace them.'0 6 The antitrust
risks of vertical mergers in export trade may depend on the
concentration of firms in the domestic market, the ease of en-
try into production, and the availability of potential markets. If
the market is not highly concentrated, access to production is
not prohibitively expensive, and potential markets do exist,
98. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 52 7 (a).
99. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1967).
100. See, e.g., Luria Brothers and Co. v. F.T.C., 389 F.2d 847 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968).
101. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
103. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 527(a).
By thus 'narrowing' the opportunities of competitors, it is thought that fore-
closure may threaten the survival of one or more existing rivals and discour-
ages potential entrants, leading to higher concentration at one or the other
horizontal stage. And that, of course, is the principal, if not the only, signifi-
cant potential harm to the ultimate consumers of the end-product in ques-
tion.
Id.
104. Id. Market concentration levels refer to the number of firms in the indus-
try. The fewer the firms in the industry, the greater the concentration. See L. SULLI-
VAN, supra note 4, at § 22.
105. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 52 7 (a).
106. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
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then vertical mergers do not pose a substantial threat to do-
mestic competition. 10 7 If the market is highly concentrated
and access to production is prohibitively expensive, 0 8 a verti-
cal merger could foreclose competitors leading to negative im-
pacts on the domestic market. In this case, the elimination of
one firm could lead to significantly higher concentrations of
firms in the domestic market. If sellers in the United States
were willing and able to supply purchasers, and access to pro-
duction were not difficult, the demise of one seller might be
immaterial.' 09
1. Exclusive Dealing and Selling Arrangements
In an exclusive dealing arrangement, a purchaser agrees
to buy goods or services from only one seller for either a speci-
fied period of time, or an indefinite period of time."10 In an
exclusive selling arrangement, the supplier appoints a sole dis-
107. The Department ofJustice Guide for International Operations also consid-
ers whether the foreign firm to be acquired has the capability of entering the United
States market. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 69, Case B, at 16. The Antitrust Guide
discusses the antitrust violation risks of a hypothetical merger between a United
States firm engaged in the manufacture of razor blades, and a small German specialty
manufacturer. Id. at 15. The Justice Department assumed that the relevant United
States razor market was concentrated, and that potential competition might have
been an important factor in the present and future market structure and behavior.
Id. at 17. However, the German manufacturer was an unlikely entrant into the
United States market, it was not an industry leader abroad and was limited in size and
resources. Id. It was unlikely that the German manufacturer was a potential entrant
into the United States market. Therefore it seemed unlikely that the Justice Depart-
ment would challenge this merger. Id. at 17-18.
The 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines indicate that they will con-
sider potential competition, market concentration, ease of entry into the market, the
acquiring firm's entry advantage, and the market share of the acquired firm, when the
department is analyzing non-horizontal mergers. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MERGER GUIDELINES, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,834-35 (June 29, 1984) (replacing 47
Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 30, 1982)) [hereinafter cited as 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES].
Although the 1984 Merger Guidelines became effective after the passage of the
ETCA, they do not consider the potential foreclosure of competitors to be an issue
when analyzing non-horizontal mergers with foreign firms. See id.
108. The automobile manufacturing industry is a good example. There are only
four firms in the domestic market. Access to production is prohibitively expensive,
and could even be considered impossible. If one automobile manufacturer were to
vertically merge with a foreign automobile distributer which deprived the other
United States automobile manufacturers of an essential exporting facility then this
could be an illegal foreclosure effect.
109. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 527(a).
110. J. DAVIDOW, ANTrrRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL MARKETING AND DISTRI-
BUTION A-13 (1983). Furthermore, agreements prohibiting the purchasers from
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tributor abroad to distribute the supplier's product.'"' Typi-
cally, the agreement usually covers a defined territory, and the
supplier agrees not to make separate deliveries into the distrib-
utor's exclusive territory.' 1 2 Exclusive arrangements may re-
sult in foreclosure when a United States exporter appoints a
foreign distributor and prevents other United States competi-
tors from selling in that territory through that distributor.'
t 3
An exclusive agreement between a United States firm and a
foreign distributor does not generally violate the antitrust
laws, 1 4 unless United States competitors are foreclosed from
"a substantial share of the line of commerce affected." ' 5
One important factor in determining whether an illegal
foreclosure effect exists is the extent of interbrand competi-
tion. 1 16 When there are many producers in the product market
and little product differentiation, 7 the exclusive arrangement
dealing with the supplier's competitors on a full requirements contract can be consid-
ered exclusive dealing as well. Id.
111. Id. at A-11.
112. Id.
113. Note, supra note 7, at 1327-28.
114. Fox, supra note 37, at 76.
An agreement by an American firm to sell abroad exclusively through a cer-
tain foreign distributor is within the protection of . . .the Sherman Act.
Moreover, no injury to competition anywhere is likely to result. If there
were any injury to competition, the harm would be visited upon consumers
in foreign markets, who would lose the possible benefits of intrabrand com-
petition (i.e., competition among sellers of the same brand).
Id.
115. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949)). The line of commerce
refers to the type of goods, wares, or merchandise involved in the controversy. 365
U.S. at 327. See E-H Int'l, Inc. v. Autek Sys. Corp., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,026 (N.D. Cal. Feb 11, 1982), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1983). In E-H nterna-
tional the defendant allegedly pirated the plaintiff's entire trained sales and service
work force in Japan and entered into an exclusive dealing contract with them. The
court concluded that this exclusive dealing contract did not constitute a restraint of
competition in the waveform analyzer market even though the plaintiff was fore-
closed from the market. Id. at 70,715. The E-H International court found that the
plaintiff was not actually excluded from the market. Id. at 70,716.
116. See J. DAVIDOW, supra note 110 at A-13. Interbrand competition occurs
among manufacturers or distributors of different brands. Intrabrand competition oc-
curs among manufacturers or distributors the same brands.
117. See Areeda, Market Definition and Horizontal Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST LJ. 553,
567-68 (1983). Differentiated products are those that manufacturers have persuaded
buyers to think are distinguishable from their competitor's products. Manufacturers
differentiate products through style, brand marks and names, and advertising. Id.
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is not likely to violate the antitrust laws.' If, however, an un-
certified United States exporter lacking Title III certification
were to require, as a condition to the agreement, that the dis-
tributor not sell the goods of a competitor, then the agreement
would be valid only to the extent that the excluded competi-
tors and harmed consumers were not located in the United
States. 1 9 If domestic competitors were excluded from the ex-
port market, the ETCA would limit the applicability of the
Sherman Act to those cases in which the conduct has a "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect"'' 2 0 on the export
trade of a United States firm. If a particular foreign distributor
were the only distributor in a particular market, and access to
this market was "necessary to sustain a sufficient number of
viable American competitors in order to preserve healthy com-
petition in the United States,"' 2' then the exclusive dealing ar-
rangement would be struck down for having illegally fore-
closed domestic competitors.' 22 Therefore, exclusive dealing
arrangements would present foreclosure risks only when the
arrangement would negatively affect the United States market.
2. Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements in export commerce do not violate
the Sherman Act if there are no injuries to the export com-
merce of a person engaged in such trade in the United
States. 23 Tying arrangements 24 are agreements in which a
party contracts to sell one product, but only on the condition
118. SeeJ. DAVIDOW, supra note 110, at A-13.
119. Fox, supra note 37, at 76-77.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l).
121. Fox, supra note 37, at 77.
122. See id.
123. 15 U.S.C.§ 6a.
124. See 8 SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, VERTICAL
RESTRICTIONS UPON BUYERS LIMITING PURCHASES OF GOODS FROM OTHERS. (1982)
[hereinafter VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS]; Butler, Lane & Phillips, The Futility of Antitrust
Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An Econonmic and Legal AnalYsis, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 173 (1984); see
also Industria Siciliana Asfalti S.p.A v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 1977-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61,256 (S.D.N.Y 1977). In Industria Siciliana an Italian oil refiner
claimed it was the victim of an illegal tying agreement and was allowed to invoke the
Sherman Act even though the only material injury was in Italy. Id. at 70,783-84.
Industria Siciliana was overruled by the ETCA because no direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect was shown on the export trade of a United States person.
15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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that the buyer will either purchase another product, or agrees
that he will not purchase that product from any other sup-
plier.' 25 In the domestic market, tying arrangements may be
per se illegal under the Sherman Act, 1 26 and have been chal-
lenged under section 3 of the Clayton Act.' 2 7 The Supreme
Court has invalidated tying arrangements on the grounds that
such arrangements extend a seller's monopoly power over the
tied product into the tied product market, 28 thereby possibly
foreclosing competition in that market.'
29
3. Licensing Agreements
When United States firms license industrial property
rights to foreign persons, such agreements are within the
scope of the Sherman Act only to the extent that they harm
domestic markets or the export opportunities of other United
States firms in a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
manner. 3 ° A licensing agreement is an arrangement in which
125. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
126. VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS, supra note 124, at 1; see also ANTITRUST LAw DE-
VELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 77-89 (elements of a per se violation).
127. See Butler, Lane, & Phillips supra note 124, at 174; see, e.g., Forner Enters.,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
Generally, Sherman Act violations result when there are two distinct, and sepa-
rate products and the seller conditions the sale of the first product on the purchase of
the second one. The seller must have considerable market power in the tied product
market, and the arrangement must effect a substantial volume of commerce. See But-
let, Lane & Phillips, supra note 124, at 175-76; ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 1, at 75-93. A Sherman or Clayton Act violation will generally be found when;
1) the seller has two distinct tied products, 2) there is an agreement to sell one prod-
uct or service conditioned on the purchase of another, 3) the seller either has consid-
erable market power and the tying arrangement affects a substantial volume of com-
merce. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 77.
128. See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). North-
ern Pacific involved a railroad's "preferred routing" provisions, which required buyers
and lessees of Northern Pacific's land holdings to commit themselves to shipping on
Northern Pacific's railroad line, even though other carriers may have had less expen-
sive rates. The Supreme Court found the Sherman Act applicable if the arrangement
imposed an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product market, and
-affected a "not insubstantial" amount of the tied product's commerce. Id. at 6; see also
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
129. Butler, Lane & Phillips, supra note 124, at 177; see also International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 6a; see also Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,208 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In this case, the court granted a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim in which relief can be
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the holder of an industrial property right receives a royalty
from a licensee,' 3 ' and, in exchange, the licensee is allowed to
benefit from the right. 3 2  License agreements may violate
United States antitrust laws. The grant of a license is not only
dependent on the payment of a license fee, but may also be
dependent on other obligations to the licensor. 3 3
United States courts have outlawed reciprocal licensing ar-
rangements which incorporated territorial restrictions that al-
located world markets. 134 Such agreements would probably
still be considered illegal if domestic competition would be af-
fected by allocating the United States to one firm exclu-
sively.13 5 A territorial restriction imposed on a foreign licensee
banning sales to third markets would not be challenged unless
there were an effect on United States commerce.' 36
4. Mergers with Foreign Firms
The merger of a United States firm with a foreign firm 137
is the absorption of a previously separate firm into the com-
granted. Id. 7 66,208 Pfizer tied geographic market allocation schemes to the grant
of licenses for an anti-depressant. Id. $$ 66,814. The court in applying the ETCA
amendments to the Sherman Act, found that the plaintiff failed to allege in its com-
plaint that the defendant's conduct had an effect on United States trade or com-
merce. Id. $$ 66,814-15.
131. See J. DAVIDOW, supra note 110, at A-17; ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 1, at 499.
132. J. DAVIDOW, supra note 110, at A-18.
133. Id. "American courts have outlawed schemes in which reciprocal patent,
know-how, or trademark licenses with territorial restrictions were employed as key
features of a broad scheme to allocate world markets." Id. at A-18, citing United
States v. Bayer Co., 135 F.Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Imperial
Chemical Indus., Ltd., 100 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 83 F.Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd as modified, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F.Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1949), modified,
115 F.Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F.Supp. 989
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F.Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
134. United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F.Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F.Supp. 284 (N.D.Ohio 1949), aff'd as modified, 341
U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F.Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), affd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
136. Id.
137. See Jackson, Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to International Investment: Joint
Ventures, MVeigers and Acquisitions, 5 N.CJ. INT'L 1.. & CoM. REG. 141 (1980); Halverson.
supra note 81.
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mon ownership and control of another firm.'" 8 In the domes-
tic market, the merger of firms that are competitors in the
same product line is a horizontal restriction of trade'3 9 and
may be seen as an alternative to cartelization. 4 ° In the inter-
national market, an acquisition may be viewed as a vertical re-
striction when a United States firm acquires a customer or sup-
plier in the foreign market.' 4 '
A United States firm may merge with a foreign firm in or-
der to penetrate foreign markets. 142 Ordinarily, section 7 of
the Clayton Antitrust Act 143 would not prevent a United States
firm from merging with a foreign firm when the potential ad-
verse effects on competition resulting from such a merger
would occur outside the United States. 44 An acquisition could
violate the Sherman Act if the acquisition of the foreign firm
forecloses access to the market to other United States firms,
and access to the foreclosed market is necessary to support a
sufficient number of viable firms in the United States.
145
III. MARKET DEFINITIONS RELEVANT FOR
DETERMINING ILLEGAL FORECLOSURE
EFFECTS
Defining markets is neither a jurisdictional prerequisite
nor a significant statutory issue; 14 6 rather it provides a basis for
determining if an illegal foreclosure effect exists. 4 7 A "mar-
ket," in economic terms is a firm or a unified group of firms
138. L. Sullivan, supra note 4, § 193 (1977); see also ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS, supra note 1, at 147-214.
139. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, § 192 (1977).
140. Id.
Horizontal merger is, in a sense, an alternative to cartelization, though (in-
volving as it does a fuller integration) it may stem from very different mo-
tives and may have effects (including some social value) which cartelization
cannot achieve.
Id.
141. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 174-78.
142. See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 107.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 18; see also supra note 1.
144. See Baker, Market Definition in TransnationalJoint Vlentures, Vergers and .llonopo-
lization, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 115 (B. Hawk ed. 1985).
145. See Fox, supra note 37, at 77-79.
146. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, § 12.
147. See id.; see also ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 149; 1 J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 59, § 7.23.
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having market power in dealing with a particular group of buy-
ers.' 4 8 Delineation of the relevant product and geographic
markets is necessary to determine the extent to which competi-
tion has been foreclosed from the export market. 49 The likeli-
hood of an illegal foreclosure effect must be judged in relation
to the market affected.' 50 Therefore, the problem of defining
an export market must be resolved by looking to the objectives
of the antitrust laws, and not to statutes.' 5' In the domestic
market, it is "unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors
from any substantial market."'' 52 The goal of the ETCA was to
increase efficiencies in export practices.'5 " Therefore, the sub-
stantiality of the foreclosure in an export market should be
measured against the full range of export opportunities avail-
able to these rivals in both the product and geographic mar-
kets.
In defining relevant markets, 54 the three elements that
148. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937
(1981). In the domestic market, if demand were held constant, and either prices
were raised, or the volume of the product were decreased within the defined area,
then supply from alternative sources would never be sufficient to restore the former
price or volume. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, § 12. Market power can also be defined
as the ability to raise price by restricting output. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 15, at § 501. The significance of market power depends not only on its degree
but also on its durability. In a perfectly competitive market with easy access to pro-
duction, if firms are making excess profits in the market, then additional manufactur-
ers will enter the industry and expand output until price equals long-run marginal
costs of production. Id. Therefore, substantial market power can persist only if there
are significant barriers to entry. Id. "A simple economic meaning of the term 'market
power' is the ability to raise price above marginal cost." Landes & Posner, supra, at
939. "Under perfect competition price equals marginal cost, so if a firm's price is
above its marginal cost, the implication is that the firm does not face perfect competi-
tion i.e. that it has at least some market power." Id.
149. See 1 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 59, at § 7.23.
150. Tampa Elec. Co., v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
151. The objectives of the antitrust laws are to maintain free and unfettered
competition. See supra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
152. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
153. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
154. The 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines define a market as:
[A] product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is sold
such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regula-
tion, that was the only present and future seller of those products in that
area would impose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price
above prevailing or likely future levels.
1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 107, at 26,827.
In the domestic market, the relevant geographic market is the narrowest market
that is wide enough so that products from other areas, or from different producers in
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need to be determined are the geographic,1 55 product, 56 and
production dimensions. 57 When determining illegal foreclo-
sure effects in export markets the market should be defined
from the exporters' perspective 58 because Congress intended
to protect rival exporters' in the ETCA.1 59  Although buyer
protection is the main goal of the antitrust laws,' 60 the courts
have also sought to protect sellers from the anticompetitive ef-
fect of both vertical and horizontal arrangements in export
trade.1 6' In export trade, however, protection of sellers is an
that same area, cannot compete with those included in the other markets. L. SULLI-
VAN, supra note 4, § 12. For example, the relevant geographic market is the smallest
area in which the costs to outside firms to transport the product into the area prevent
them from being able to sell at as low a price as firms within the area. See id.
In the export market, however, the relevant geographic market includes not only
the area in question, but all other areas to which an exporter can export without
confronting detrimental effects that can have negative impacts on United States con-
sumers. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a; Note, Defining International Geographic Markets in American
Antitrust Suits, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1981); infra notes 196-202 and accompanying
text. The relevant product market includes not only the product in question but all
other products that the exporter can switch to without incurring any detrimental ef-
fects that can have negative impacts on United States consumers. See 1 J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, supra note 59, at §§ 7.23-7.24.
155. See infra notes 181-202 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 163-80 and accompanying text. In the domestic market defi-
nition, the product dimension encompasses all the products that are close enough
substitutes to be included in the same market. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
15, § 517. For the purposes of this Note "product" refers to both products and
services. Sometimes the relevant product being exported is a service, e.g., an engi-
neering joint venture; ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 69, at Case C.
157. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 517. The production dimen-
sion defines which products can be manufactured with the same production facilities.
Id; see also id. at § 526. Producer substitutes are products that, while not close substi-
tutes for each other in the consumer markets, can be produced interchangeably from
the same production facilities. "Substitutes in supply exist when producers of other
products are able to enter into the production of the product by modifying existing
facilities or constructing new facilities within a relatively short period." CERTIFICATE
GUIDEINES, supra note 37, at 1795.
158. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 4013. The ETCA confines Sherman Act violations to
those situations where other United States exporters experience negative impacts.
Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra note 15; see also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PER-
spEcriV (1976); Karp, supra note 14 at 163-66.
161. See Harris &Jorde, supra note 14, at 16-17; United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
[T]he freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is
the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such free-
dom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of
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important consideration. The ETCA specifically states that a
foreclosure effect is not subject to the Sherman Act unless it
substantially affects the export trade of a United States person
with a foreign nation. 62
A. Product Markets
Foreclosure may be defined as the inability of an exporter
to sell his products in a particular geographic area because an-
other exporter has precluded the opportunities to sell in that
area. 163 In defining export trade markets, delineation of the
relevant product market provides the basis for defining the rel-
evant geographic market.' 64 The product market should be
defined from the exporter's perspective, becoming broader as
the number of substitutes in production and alternative mar-
kets increase.' 65  For the purpose of Title III certification 66
the United States government will analyze the relevant product
market by first considering each product for which certification
is sought as a separate market.' 67  The market may then be
broadened to the extent that close substitutes exist in demand
or supply which might limit the exercise of market power by a
firm or group of firms. 168
In economic terms, the domestic product market is de-
fined by the the cross-elasticity of demand 69 between the
the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such
foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector
of the economy.
Id.; see also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (Sherman
Act prohibited manufacturer's and retailers' boycott of a small retail store).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l)(B).
163. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 527a.
164. See Harris & Jorde, supra note 14, at 46-47; see, e.g., Pacific Coast Agricul-
tural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, 526 F.2d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); E-H Int'l, Inc. v. Autek Sys. Corp., 1982-83 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,026, 70,713 (N.D. Ca 1982), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1983);
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F.Supp. 680, 688
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). In all these cases the analysis of the geographic markets follows the
analysis of the region where the consumer purchases the products at issue.
165. See CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 1794-95; see also Harris &
Jorde, supra note 14, at 46-47.
166. See supra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
167. See CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 1794.
168. See id. at 1795.
169. Elasticity is the relationship between the magnitude of quantity changes in
purchases per unit of time to small changes in price. See Landes & Posner, supra note
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product itself and its substitutes. 70  However, because cross-
elasticity defines the consumer's willingness to switch to other
products as the price of the product in question increases, this
definition defines the markets from the consumer's perspec-
tive.' 7 ' Therefore, in the export product market definition, the
relevance of a foreclosure effect depends on the existence of
alternative markets, and the ability of exporters to switch to
other products if no such alternative markets exist.1 7 2 If ex-
148, at 940 n.8. Demand is elastic when a small price change results in a relatively
larger change in the volume of purchases. See P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 114 n.28.
For example, small reductions in prices lead to large increases in purchases, while
small price increases lead to large decreases in sales. See id. Demand is inelastic
when a small price change results in an even relatively smaller change in total
purchases. See id. When demand is elastic, reductions in price lead to increases in
total revenue. See id. When demand is inelastic, reductions in prices lead to reduc-
tions in total revenue. See id. For example, an elasticity of demand of -2 indicates
that if price rose (or fell) by one percent, quantity demanded would fall (or rise) by
two percent. Landes & Posner, supra, at 940 n.8. The negative sign, which is often
dropped for simplicity, indicates that price and quantity move in opposite directions.
Id.
Cross-elasticity of demand is the effect of the change in the price of a product
has on the sales of substitute or complementary products. See United States v. E.I.
Du Pont & Co.; 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956). The Court in Du Pont held that the cross-
elasticity of demand of cellophane to other flexible packaging materials prevented Du
Pont from possessing monopoly control over price. Id. If the price of aluminum foil
was to stay constant, and the price of cellophane wrap increased, then the sales of
aluminum foil would increase as consumers switch to it. Complementary products
are items that are typically used together. When the sales of one product fall in re-
sponse to the price increase of a complementary product this is known as negative
cross-elasticity of demand. For example, sales of tennis racquets would fall if the
price of tennis balls were increased. Cross-elasticity is positive when products are
substitutes for each other. See Landes & Posner, supra note 148, at 960 n.39.
170. United States v. Tracinda Inv. Co., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1103 (C.D. CA
1979).
171. See supra note 169.
172. See generally, Areeda, supra note 117, at 570-72. Professor Areeda discusses
the production dimension aspect when defining the market from the producer's per-
spective. Id. Government agencies and courts have examined production flexibility
as an important factor in product market determination. The Justice Department's
1982 Merger Guidelines recognize that "production substitution may allow firms that
do not currently produce the relevant product to respond effectively to an increase in
the price of that product." U.S. DEPT. oFJUsTIcE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 47 Fed. Reg.
28,493 (June 30, 1982). See generally, Beatrice Foods Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,035 (FTC 1983) (concurring opinion of Commissioner Douglas). Sometimes
products are considered to be in the same product market if firms can readily switch
their production capabilities from one product to another. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co.
Inc., v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962) (cross-elasticity of production
facilities may also be important); Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385, 576 (1980)(there is
also some supply-side interchangeability of productive facilities); Coca-Cola Bottling
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porters can switch without impacting negatively on United
States consumers,' 73 these products should be included in the
same export product market. If negative impacts would be felt
by United States consumers because of a switch in production,
then these products should be excluded from the relevant
product market definition. 174 In the domestic market, when
two firms offer products which buyers consider perfect substi-
tutes, those products are considered to be in the same mar-
ket.' 75  Export markets should include these substitutes only
when the switching costs to exporters does not result in nega-
tive impacts on the United States consumers. 76
When viewing the product market from the exporters'
perspective, the production dimension is of primary impor-
tance when the exporter is also the manufacturer.' 77 If a pro-
ducer can readily switch production to other products, the
product market should be defined to include these substitute
products.1 7  If the costs of switching production to a substi-
tute product would force the producer to suffer a loss that
Co., 93 F.T.C. 110, 204-05 (1979) (supply-side flexibility is also an important factor);
RSR Corp., 88 F.T.C. 800, 876-77 (1976), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 477, 585 (1972) (firms occupying
common "supply space" are in the same product market).
173. See supra note 15. In considering what constitutes a negative impact on
United States consumers, it is important to consider the potential effects on the do-
mestic product market that could occur if the producer was to switch to another
product. If the exporter switched production to another product and United States
consumers experienced either: 1) a shortage of the formerly produced product, or
2) an increase in the price of the discontinued product, this would constitute a nega-
tive impact on American consumers. The concern with the effects of export trade
practices on American consumers is related to the theory that a primary concern of
the antitrust laws is the protection of consumers' interests. Id.
174. See id.
175. Karp, supra note 4, at 224; see also United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
and Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). In this case, the defendant produced approximately
seventy-five percent of all cellophane sold in the United States. Id. at 379. Cello-
phane made up less than twenty percent of the total supply of flexible wrapping
materials sold in the United States. Id. The Court compared the various types of
flexible wrapping materials and found that if the price of cellophane was increased,
consumers switched to other flexible wraps. Id. at 395-400. Therefore, the Court
defined the market to include both cellophane and these substitutes. Id.
176. See supra notes 15 and 173 (consumer protection is a primary concern of
United States antitrust law).
177. See generally CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES supra note 37 at 332-34. When deter-
mining whether or not to certify ajoint export arrangement, the Department of Com-
merce will consider the ease of entry into the production dimension. Id.
178. See supra note 175.
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could have negative impacts on United States consumers, then
the market should be defined narrowly. 7 9 When the exporter
is merely an export intermediary, and not a manufacturer, the
product market should be defined broadly. In this case, the
production dimension is irrelevant, because the intermediaries
are not the manufacturers but merely exporters. In this type of
situation, it is easier for an export intermediary to switch to a
different product than it is for a manufacturer to switch to a
different product. Furthermore, the possibility of there being
negative effects on United States consumers is diminished.'
B. Geographic Markets
Once the relevant product market is defined, the next step
in delineating export markets for the purpose of determining
when foreclosure of export markets has occurred is to define
the relevant geographic markets from the perspective of com-
petitor exporters involved in the trade of that relevant prod-
uct.'8 ' Geographic markets must be determined so that a geo-
graphic boundary can be established "that roughly separates
firms that are important factors in the competitive analysis
from those that are not."1 8 2
1. Defining Geographic Markets from the Exporters'
Perspective
The economic definition for geographic markets is "the
area within which price tends towards uniformity, allowing for
differences in transportation costs." '83 However, a legal defi-
nition which has been frequently used by courts in the United
States, is the "area of effective competition in the known line
179. See supra notes 15 and 173.
180. But see Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526
F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). Pacific Coast Agricultural
Export Association was an export intermediary engaged in the export of oranges to
Hong Kong. Id. at 1200. Sunkist Growers was an agricultural cooperative of citrus
fruit growers who effectively foreclosed Pacific Coast from the Hong Kong export
market. Id. at 1200-01. The court found that the antitrust laws were violated. Id. at
1202-05. This case was decided, however, before the ETCA was enacted, and there
was no discussion of the production dimension, nor other potential geographic ex-
port markets other than Hong Kong.
181. See infra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
182. CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 1795; see also the discussion on
potential markets, infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
183. Baker, supra note 144, at 120.
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of commerce.., in which the seller operates and to which the
purchaser can practically turn for supplies."' 4 In defining ge-
ographic export markets, courts should look to the geographic
area where exporters' profits tend toward uniformity.'" 5 A ge-
ographic comparison of transportation, tariff, and non-tariff
barriers should be made to determine actual profits.' 86 The
geographic export market may be restricted to the extent that
transportation, tariff and non-tariff barrier costs may reduce
the exporters' profits to zero.'8 7 When the exporters' profits
in two separate geographic areas are equal,18 8 this strongly in-
dicates that they are in the same geographic export market.'8 9
Under the economic definition of the term geographic
market, "[w]hen prices and price movements in two territories
are closely correlated, a single market definition is strongly in-
dicated."' 9 ° However, as long as there are profits to be made,
exporters have often sold at a lower local price and absorb
market barrier costs. 191 While price may be equal in two areas,
184. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961);
United States v. Tracinda Investment Co., 477 F.Supp. 1093, 1105 (C.D. CA 1979).
185. See infra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
186. CERTIFICATE GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 1795. A good or service may
sometimes bring a higher price in one area than another, but there may be higher
transportation costs to the area were the price is greater as well. If barrier costs are
the same, and if the exporter's profits in both areas are equal, then these two areas
should be included in the same market. Id.
187. Id. Transportation costs, tariffs and non-tariff barriers are "market barri-
ers." See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 523. Market barriers limit the
ability of firms to sell in a particular area. Id.
[T]he significance of transporation costs as an indication of separate mar-
kets depends entirely on their relation to prices in the areas concerned, and
on the presence or absence of cross-shipments. Transporation costs be-
tween two areas, say A and B, may be either roughly equal to or substantially
greater than the difference between the prices in A and B. One-way or two-
way cross-shipments may be non-existent, episodic or persistent.
Id.
188. Profits are defined in this Note as sales price minus transportation costs
minus barrier cost.
189. Cf. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 523(b): "Minneapolis sell-
ers, because of transport cost, would net only $.90 on sales in Chicago, [which is]
$.20 less than the $1.10 they can obtain in Minneapolis. Under virtually any assump-
tion, the Chicago price would have to rise substantially to induce them to sell there."
Id.
This example demonstrates that exporters will view two areas as separate mar-
kets based on their profit expectations. See id.
190. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 522(a).
191. Cf. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 523(c)(2) ("Producers may
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the exporters' profit margin in one area is lower." 2 If this oc-
curs, the two areas should not be included in the same mar-
ket. 193
Price is not a good indicator of market differentiation in
the export market definition because price defines markets
from the buyers' perspective, and not the sellers' perspec-
tive.1 94 Therefore, the profits of exporters should be analyzed.
If the exporters' profits are equal, it indicates that the geo-
graphic areas should be included in the same market because
this would define the market from the exporters' perspec-
tive.t95 If net profits to the exporters differ between the geo-
graphic areas, then those areas are in separate markets.
2. Potential Markets
The relevant geographic export market includes both ac-
tual and potential purchasers of the exporters' product.196 If
persistently 'export' goods to another area notwithstanding that transport costs ex-
ceed any price difference between the two areas.").
192. For example, Areas A and B are two separate geographic markets with ap-
proximately the same number of buyers for product X. Price for product X in the
two areas is the same, but the transportation costs to area B are higher for firm Y.
Even though price is equal, firm Y's profits are not.
193. When there are no cross-area sales, then market barrier costs exceed any
price differential between the two areas, and the areas are in two separate markets.
See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, § 522(a). But even if exporters earn less
on export sales than on their local sales, exporters may still enter the export market
because profits can still be made. See id. This is the case when producers persistently
export goods although transportation costs exceed any price difference. Id.
194. See supra note 169 (discussion on elasticity of demand and cross elasticity of
demand). As prices rise consumers either stop buying the product or switch to other
products. Id.
195. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text; Harris &Jorde, supra note
14, at 51.
196. See id. at 1081; see also Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961) (Supreme Court used the potential market analysis to determine geographic
markets). See generally Note, supra note 154; Landes & Posner, supra note 148, at 967.
Factors taken into consideration in determining the feasibility of potential markets
should include: a) tariff and non-tariff barriers, b) consumer preferences,
c) transportation costs, d) the "time element," i.e. whether the time period (which
inherently assumes the cost element) necessary to develop these new markets makes
the project economically unfeasible in the short-run without damage to the firm that
would lead to negative effects on United States consumers.
The plaintiff may also introduce evidence that the market in dispute is the only
truly relevant market. Evidence indicating that the native population of this geo-
graphic market is the only consumer of the product in question favors this analysis.
Export conduct should be closely scrutinized for domestic anticompetitive effects
FORECLOSURE IN EXPORT TRADE
competitor exporters are foreclosed from the geographic mar-
ket at issue, then the courts should look to other potential mar-
kets to which the exporter can export. Foreclosure should be
measured against the full range of export opportunities avail-
able to the export competitors. If it is possible to switch to
these markets without United States consumers experiencing
any long-term negative effects, these potential markets should
be included in the analysis because a too narrow view of the
market would increase the risk of finding an antitrust violation
by the courts.1 9 7 As a result, many export practices could be
deterred, thereby defeating the purposes of the ETCA."'9
When determining if there has been an illegal foreclosure in an
export market, the alternative geographic markets should be
defined as expansively as possible but narrowly enough to pro-
tect export opportunities. 199
At any given time, however, the market at issue may be the
only market available to a particular group of exporters, or it
may offer cost and profit advantages that make it superior to all
other markets.20 ° In this case, there is a high risk of finding
illegal effects foreclosure by the courts because the market is
by definition narrow. If a market is an essential exporting facil-
ity that is necessary to support a viable number of United
States firms, 20 1 and if foreclosure to rival exporters could have
serious negative anticompetitive impacts within the United
States, then this market should be treated separately with no
analysis of potential markets.20 2
when the relevant markets are concentrated and the participants in the proposed
markets have market power. Margulies, supra note 8, at 293.
197. See Note, supra note 154, at 1078-79.
But a firm with market power is prohibited from engaging in certain busi-
ness practices, even though those practices would be permissible in an at-
omistic industry. By reducing the size of export markets, courts make it in-
creasingly likely that each firm will have market power in some areas in





200. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 59, § 7.26.
201. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
202. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER:., supra note 59, § 7.24. When alternative
markets exist, however, national markets should not be determinative. Id. Note,
supra note 7, at 1327. Foreclosure of a single national market to an exporter may not
result in higher prices for United States buyers and only have a minimum effect on
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CONCLUSION
When delineating markets to determine illegal foreclosure
effects, the product and geographic markets should be defined
as broadly as possible.2 °3 The purpose of the ETCA is to en-
courage United States exports by clarifying the risks of poten-
tial antitrust violations in export trade activities.20 4 Restrictive
market delineation practices could thwart this goal.
In evaluating whether export conduct will substantially re-
strain the export trade of a competitor, the focus should be on
the effect of such conduct within the United States and the
business justification for the conduct. A balancing approach
should be used to determine if the anticompetitive effects out-
weigh the positive impacts of the restrictive export practices.
The anticompetitive effects are relevant only insofar as they oc-
cur within the United States. Negative effects outside the
United States do not pose antitrust risks. Once it is deter-
mined that anticompetitive effects are present within the
United States, both the actual and potential markets should be
viewed from the exporters' perspective.
Elayne K. Robertson*
other United States exporters. IJ. ATwoOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 59, § 7.24. If
the national market in question represents only a single minor portion of United
States trade of that product, no antitrust violations should be found.
203. See supra notes 146-202 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
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